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ABSTRACT 
The Internet Threat Monitoring (ITM),is a globally scoped Internet monitoring system whose goal is to 
measure, detect, characterize, and track threats such as distribute denial of service(DDoS) attacks and 
worms. To block the monitoring system in the internet the attackers are targeted the ITM system. In this 
paper we address flooding attack against ITM system in which the attacker attempt to exhaust the 
network and ITM’s resources, such as network bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data 
structures by sending the malicious traffic. We propose an information-theoretic frame work that models 
the flooding attacks using Botnet on ITM. Based on this model we generalize the flooding attacks and 
propose an effective attack detection using Honeypots. 
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  1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet was initially designed for openness and scalability. The infrastructure allows the 
user to misuse and it is the opportunity to the attackers there to perform some malicious 
transactions. On the Internet, anyone can send any packet to anyone without being 
authenticated, while the receiver has to process any packet that arrives to a provided service. 
The lack of authentication means that attackers can create a fake identity, and send malicious 
traffic with impunity. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack [2] is an explicit attempt by attackers to 
prevent an information service’s legitimate users from using that service. These attacks, attempt 
to weaken and blocks the the victim’s resources, such as bandwidth available in the network, 
computing power of the system, or operating system data structures. Flood attack, Ping of Death 
attack, SYN attack, Teardrop attack, DDoS, and Smurf attack are the most common types of 
DoS attacks. The hackers who launch DDoS attacks typically target sites or services provided 
by high-profile organizations, such as government agencies, banks, credit-card payment 
gateways, and even root name servers. 
         A flooding-based Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is performed by the 
attacker by sending a huge amount of unwanted traffic to the victim system and it is the very 
commonly used attack by the attacker. Network level congestion control can throttle peak traffic 
to protect the network. Network monitors are used to monitor the traffic in the networks to 
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classify them as genuine or attack traffic and also these monitors gives the traffic as an input to 
several DDoS detection algorithms for detection of DDoS attacks.  However, it cannot stop the 
quality of service (QoS) for legitimate traffic from going down because of attacks. Two features 
of DDoS attacks hinder the advancement of defense techniques. First, it is hard to distinguish 
between DDoS attack traffic and normal traffic. There is a lack of an effective differentiation 
mechanism that results in minimal collateral damage for legitimate traffic. Second, the sources 
of DDoS attacks are also difficult to find in a distributed environment. Therefore, it is difficult 
to stop a DDoS attack effectively.  
                The Internet Threat Monitoring (ITM) System basically has two main components 
one is centralized data center and another is the number of monitors which are distributed across 
the Internet. Each monitor covers the range of IP addresses and monitors the traffic to send the 
traffic logs to data center. The data center now collects the traffic logs from monitors and 
analyzes the collected traffic logs to publish reports to ITM system users. 
            The collected logs, as a random sample of the Internet traffic, can still provide critical 
insights for the public to measure, characterize, and track/detect Internet security threats. The 
idea of ITM systems dates back to DShield and CAIDA network telescope [4], [5][17], which 
have been successfully used to analyze the activities of worms and DDoS attacks [3], [6].  
      The reason is that if an attacker discovers the monitor locations, it can easily avoid detection 
(by ITM systems) by bypassing the monitored IP addresses and directing the attack to the much 
larger space of unmonitored IP addresses. Furthermore, such an attacker may even mislead the 
reports published by an ITM system by manipulating traffic to the identified monitors, 
generating highly skewed samples. Since ITM reports are trusted by the public as a random 
(unbiased) sample of Internet traffic, the confidentiality of monitor locations is vital for the 
usability of ITM systems. 
        The attacker compromises the monitor security and it’s locations by using several attacks 
which includes Denial of service attacks (DoS), Distributed DoS (DDoS) and other attacks like 
Localization attacks [1]. The DoS and DDoS attacks creates the vulnerabilities or some 
loopholes in the software implementation to make that the resources available at the victim are 
bring down or blocked, which includes bandwidth attacks.  
             In this paper we introduce an information theoretic frame work to model existing 
flooding attacks in ITM system monitors. In the flooding attack the attacker sends the large 
volume of unwanted traffic to the targeted monitor for this he uses the botnet. Based on the 
Information-theoretic model we propose an effective approach to detect flooding attacks using 
Honey pots. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Probing traffic based Localization attack [7][8] in which an attacker sends high rate short length 
port scan messages to the targeted network to compromise the monitor locations in ITM system. 
Then, attacker queries the data center to determine whether a short spike of high-rate traffic 
appears in the queried time-series data, for confirmation of the attack. 
     A steganographic localization attack [9] an attacker launches a stream of low-rate port-scan 
probing traffic which is marginally modulated by a secret Pseudonoise (PN) code. While the 
low-rate property prevents the exhibition of obvious regularity of the published traffic data at 
the data center, based on the carefully synchronized PN code, the attacker can still accurately 
identify the PN-code-modulated traffic in the retrieved published traffic data from the data 
center. Thereby, the existence of monitors in the targeted network can be compromised. To this 
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end, the PN-code-based steganographic attack presented in our paper can be understood as a 
covert channel problem [10], because the attack traffic encoded by a signal blends into the 
background traffic and is only recognizable by the attacker which knows the secret pattern of 
the PN code. 
In [1] introduced the information theoretic framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
localization attacks by using the minimum time length required by an attacker to achieve a 
predefined detection rate as the metric. But this frame work is defined in specific to the 
localization attacks only; they are not given any solution for other DDoS attacks. The frame 
work allows the ITMs which are registered within the data center given, and the access is 
restricted to that private region only. But public access of the ITMs and data center allows more 
scope to provide security against different attacks. 
3. PROPOSED WORK 
In [1] the authors define a model in which the ITMs in the networks sends the traffic logs 
periodically to the data center and the data center collects the traffic logs and publishes the 
reports to ITM system users which are registered, that means it creates the private environment 
or region .In the private region the scope for DDoS attacks are very less, and they are restricted 
this model only for Localization attacks. In this section we have defined a model which will 
provide the following extensions. 
Public accessing: Public accessing of the data center increases the network usage and provides 
better communication with the outside world rather than private environment. In this any user 
from outside the private region can get the communication with the private network, if the user 
is genuine he can get the status of the monitor before sending the data to internal monitors, to 
avoid the attacks. If the user is an attacker, then this status information can be misused to 
perform the attacks on the monitor. The data center sends the status information to any users 
(public or private) based on the request query, but the private (internal) users can get the highest 
priority. 
Usage of Botnets for Flooding Attack:   
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent an information 
service’s legitimate users from using that service. In a DDoS attack, these attempts come from a 
large number of distributed hosts that coordinate to flood the victim with an abundance of attack 
packets simultaneously. The attacker may use the botnets [11], [12] and other alternatives to 
launch the attack.  
3.1 Flooding: 
      Launching a flooding attack:  Once the DDoS network has been set up and the infrastructure 
for communication between the agents and the handlers established, all that an attacker needs to 
do is to issue commands to the agents to start sending packets to the victim host. The agents try 
to send unusual data packets (all TCP flags set, repeated TCP SYN packets, Large ICMP 
packets) to maximize the possibility of causing disruption at the victim and the intermediate 
nodes. There are certain basic packet attack types which are favorites of the attack tool 
designers. All the attack tools use a combination of these packet attack types to launch a DDoS 
attack. The basic attack types are 
i)  TCP floods: A stream of packets with various flags (SYN,RST, ACK) are sent to the victim 
machine. The TCP SYN flood works by exhausting the TCP connection queue of the host and 
thus denying legitimate connection requests. TCP ACK floods can cause disruption at the nodes 
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corresponding to the host addresses of the floods as well. Also the one known tool that uses 
TCP ACK flooding (mstream [13]) has been known to cause disruptions in a router even with a 
moderate packet rate. Both TCP SYN flooding and the mstream attack constitute a group of 
attacks known as asymmetric attacks (Attacks where a less powerful system can render a much 
more powerful system useless).  
ii)  ICMP floods (e.g ping floods): A stream of ICMP packets is sent to the victim host. A 
variant of the ICMP floods is the Smurf attack in which a spoofed IP packet consisting of an 
ICMP ECHO_REQUEST is sent to a directed broadcast address. The RFC for ICMP specifies 
that no ECHO_REPLY packets should be generated for broadcast addresses, but unfortunately 
many operating systems and router vendors have failed to incorporate this into their 
implementations. As a result, the victim host (in this case the machine whose IP address was 
spoofed by the attacker) receives ICMP ECHO_REPLY packets from all the hosts on the 
network and can easily crash under such loads. Such networks are known as amplifier networks 
and thousands of such networks have been documented. 
iii)  UDP floods: A huge amount of UDP packets are sent to the victim host. Trinoo is a popular 
DDoS tool that uses UDP floods as one of its attack payloads. 
3.2 BOTs 
The attacker uses the bots to generate huge number of packets to attack the victim by sending 
these huge packets as large traffic to generate flooding attack. The attacker first identifies the 
compromised servers in terms of security and controls the systems which are under the control 
of these compromised servers. The compromised systems under the servers known as the bot. 
Normally the attacker communicates the bots by using the Internet relay chat (IRC)[14] .IRC is 
the public network there the users can enter and communicate each other or with  the groups 
openly. 
 The attacker launches the DDoS attacks through the bots by sending the commands using these 
IRC network. The DDoS attacks can be blocked or the detection can not be possible, but by 
identifying the IRC server one can block the packets to the victim. 
 
3.3 Botnet: 
 
      Internet is the globally established network where different users or systems exist 
and it provides the better scalability and openness to the users in terms of services. The open 
accessing of the internet allows different threats and one of the major threats is from large 
number of compromised computers also called as bots or Zombies and the group of these 
computers called as Botnet. By using these botnets the attackers performs the attacks on the 
victims by simply sitting in house, from offices or organizations and any private or public 
network around the world. Every botnet or the group of compromised bots is controlled by a 
master commonly called as attacker or hacker. These botnets conducts various attacks which 
includes DDoS ,e-mail spamming, keylogging, click fraud, and spreading any malware to the 
victim. Compared to any attack the botnets consists of pool of compromised bots and these are 
capable to conduct or   damage the victim tremendously with collective power or capacity than 
the individual attacker. Example for these type of attacks are flooding, flash crowd and ports 
scan attacks there the attacker uses the botnet power to generate the large number of traffic to 
blocks the victim resources. 
    
  Attacking Behavior : During the preparation an attack, botnets normally generate a large 
amount of malicious traffic, which in turn can make possible of easy detection. Understanding 
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the attacks requires the attacking behaviour and a lot more information can reveal important 
intelligence including the nature of botnet, purpose of hackers and the origin of hackers. The  
attacking behaviours can defined from the following four aspects: 
    
 
• Infecting new hosts 
• Stealing personal information 
• Phishing and spam proxy 
• DDoS 
Infecting new hosts: Botnets often selects new hosts using same ways as the virus and worms 
do for attack. The method that botnets use to compromise new hosts is through social 
engineering and distribution of malicious emails. In general the botnet distributes the malware 
using the mail attachments. Social engineering techniques are used to trap computer users into 
executing the malware, which leads to the compromise of hosts. 
 
Stealing Sensitive Information: Recent botnets have employed complicated tools to steal 
sensitive user information from compromised hosts. The most commonly used tools for stealing 
sensitive information at victim systems are keyloggers and network traffic sniffers. Keyloggers 
modify host operating systems to spy on user activities and store user key strikes. Network 
traffic sniffers monitor network traffic sent over the subnet of the compromised host. The 
sensitive data is logged by these tools and then compiled into digested formats. Periodically, the 
data will be sent to their bot masters using various communication channels. Some commonly 
used methods are to send data through a designated IRC channel created by a botnet and in 
emails to a designated email address. BKDR_WAR.B steals  keystrokes on a compromised 
computer in this way.  
 
Sending Spam: Botnets are widely used to broadcast spam for different attack purposes. Two 
major advantages for hackers to use botnets to distribute spam are that the victims cannot trace 
the spam back to the source for legal action, and botnets can distribute a much larger volume of 
spam because of the aggregate computing power and vast availability of bandwidth. While 
some spam is used to distribute exploits (malware) as described in a previous subsection, some 
spam tricks users into visiting certain malicious websites, which install malware on their 
computers by exploiting Internet browser vulnerabilities.  
 
Distributed Denial of Service: A DDoS attack [19] is probably one of the oldest botnet attack 
mechanisms. In the infancy of botnets, hackers began using botnets to launch DDoS attacks 
against a number of large organizations to consume all of their available platform CPU cycles 
and available bandwidth, effectively slowing their services down to a crawl, or knocking out 
their services altogether. For example, both Yahoo! and Microsoft were victimized by DDoS 
attacks launched by botnets in the past years. DDoS attacks still occur, but in a lesser frequency 
and volume. DDoS attacks have even recently been used for extortion. Botnets usually integrate 
a large variety attacking tools (e.g., UDP flooding, TCP SYN flooding, HTTP flooding). Some 
bots, such as PhatBot , even have very customized DDoS tools integrated into their code. 
AgoBot, SDBot, PhatBot, and many other botnets are all capable of launching DDoS attacks 
against a variety of targets. 
 
Botnet Life Cycle: The botnet life cycle specifies that how these botnet are organised,planned 
in formation ,generation and propagation. The botnet has the following phases: 
 
1.  Bot-herder configures initial bot parameters. 
2.  Registers a DDNS. 
3.  Register a static IP. 
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4. Way of infecting the victim machines either directly through network or indirectly through 
user interaction. 
5.  Bots spread. 
6.  Adding the bots to Botnet through C & C Server. 
 7.  Bots are used for some activity (DDoS, Identity Theft etc.) 
8. Bots are updated through their Botoperator which issues update commands. 
 
3.4 IRC-based Command and Control 
A bot generally communicates with a controller to receive commands send by the attacker or 
send back information any to the attacker. It establishes the communication channel directly to 
the controller for transactions. The problem is that this connection could compromise the 
controller’s location. Instead, the bot controller can use a proxy such as public message drop 
point (e.g., a well-known message board). The websites and other drop points can introduce 
significant communication latency; a more active approach is attractive. The commonly used 
communication channel is through the IRC. 
IRC provides a common protocol that is widely used across the Internet and has simple text-
based command syntax. There is also a large number of existing IRC networks that can be used 
as public exchange points. In addition, most IRC networks lack any strong authentication, and a 
number of tools to provide anonymity on IRC networks are available. Thus, IRC provides a 
simple, low-latency, widely available, and anonymous command and control channel for botnet 
communication. An IRC network is composed of one or more IRC servers as depicted in figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1: Compromised computers. In a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS), these computers serve three 
major roles: master controller, command and control server, and bot. 
     In the botnet communication every bot connects to a public IRC network or a hidden IRC 
serveron the compromised system.The bot receives the commands directly from the IRC 
controller by entering the named channel. 
3.5 Honeypots: 
A honeypot is an effective tool for observing and understanding the behaviour of 
intruder’s tactics and intensions. A honeypot checks every packet transmitted to/from it, giving 
it the ability to collect highly determined and less noisy datasets for network attack analysis. 
Honeypots are trick computer resources set up for the purpose of monitoring and logging the 
activities of entities that probe, attack or compromise them. Honeypots can have many shapes 
and sizes; examples include dummy items in a database, low-interaction network components 
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like preconfigured traffic sinks, or full-interaction hosts with real operating systems and 
services.  
Honeypots reduces the burden on the servers or the systems interms of detection and 
logging. By capturing the small data sets of high volume it reduces the false positives and also 
captures the unknown attacks. 
Honeypot-based Research: 
Often we have a lack of precise information regarding attacks on the Internet. In most 
cases, we just see the results of attacks against networks or specific computers. For example, 
after a successful attack we just see that the compromised computer attacks further computers 
within the network. But analization of attacker strategy is very difficult to find. In addition to 
the problems gathering qualitative data, there is relatively little quantitative data on attacks 
against computer systems. In general the tools, strategies, and motives involved in computer and 
network attacks are difficult to define.  
The term honeypot[16] generally refers to an entity with certain features that make it 
especially attractive and can tempt attackers into its vicinity. Honeypots are electronic tease, i.e. 
network resources (computers, routers, switches, etc.) deployed to be probed, attacked, and 
compromised. So called low-interaction honeypots simulate certain services – often on a 
massively parallel scale. High-interactions honeypots are real world systems which run special 
software permanently collecting data about the system and greatly aiding postincident computer 
and network forensics. A honeypot is usually a computer system with no production tasks in the 
network. This aids in detection of incidents: Every interaction with the system is suspicious and 
could point to a possibly malicious action. The potential for a zero false-positives rate is a clear 
advantage of honeypots in contrast to intrusion detection systems (IDS). Because of the wealth 
of data collected through them, honeynets are considered a very useful tool to learn more about 
attack patterns and attacker behavior in communication networks like the Internet.  
Therefore honeypots have a dual use: They can be used as research instrument to learn 
about the tools, tactics, and techniques of intruders into IT-systems. In this usage scenario, 
qualitative and quantitative research is possible. Usually high-interaction honeypots tend to be 
used for qualitative research while low-interaction honeypots seem to be better suited for 
quantitative research. 
 
4. PROPOSED MODEL 
In this paper we divided the entire model into two regions namely private region and public 
region. The Internet Threat Monitors (ITM) are distributed across the Internet and each monitor 
records the traffic addressed to range of IP addresses and send the traffic logs periodically to the 
data center. The data center then analyzes the traffic logs collected from the monitors and 
publishes the reports to ITM system users. The collection of monitors under the data center 
forms the private region because the ITMs are registered before sending the logs to the data 
center. Any user can get the reports of the requested ITM by sending the query request to the 
data center and the data center is answerable to all the ITMs which are registered. 
The public region of our model specifies the unregistered users of the data center who does not 
have any permission to access the data center, but they can get the traffic reports related to any 
ITM by sending the query request to the data center. The data center scope is extended to the 
public domain but it can only give the traffic reports to the public users. Allowing the public 
users or network accessing to the data center and monitors, causes decrease in the performance 
because of the overload of the data center. These can be balanced by introducing the priorities to 
the users; the internal or private region users have the highest priority than the public users .This 
priorities does not disturb the existing scenario but this can enhance the service to the public 
domain ,this will not be a over burden to the data center.. 
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In This section we are constructing the botnet as the public user network without having any 
registration with data center and performing the flooding attack on the ITM which is local to the 
data center.  
 
                     Figure 2: Work flow of flooding attacks using botnet. 
Generation of flooding attack with Botnet: 
         A DDoS (Flooding) attack mechanism typically includes a network of several 
compromised computers [15]. These compromised computers serve three major role -master 
controller, command and control (C&C) server, and bot. An attacker generates a DDoS attack 
by exploiting vulnerabilities in one computer system and making it the DDoS “master 
controller.” From here, the attacker identifies and communicates with other compromised 
systems. A C&C server is a compromised host with a special program running on it, this server 
distributes instructions from the attacker to the rest of the bots, which form a botnet[11]. (A bot 
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is a compromised host that runs a special program.) Each C&C server is capable of controlling 
multiple bots, each of which is responsible for generating a stream of packets to the intended 
victim. Often, the bots employed to send the flood of requests are infected with a virus that lets 
attackers use them anonymously. 
A Flooding attack happens in several phases: 
• Discover vulnerable hosts. To launch a DDoS attack, attackers first build a network of 
computers that they can use to produce the volume of traffic needed to deny services to 
legitimate users. To create this network, they first scan and identify vulnerable sites or hosts. 
Vulnerable hosts are the systems usually those that run either no antivirus software or an out-of-
date version. Attackers use these compromised hosts for further scanning and compromises. 
• Establish a botnet. After gaining access, attacker must then install attack tools on the 
compromised hosts to form a botnet.  
• Launch an attack. In the next phase, attackers send commands to C&C servers for their bots to 
attack by sending hundreds of thousands of requests to the target simultaneously.  
• Flood a target. In the final phase, monitor receives a flood of requests to the point where they 
can’t operate effectively.  
5. PREVENTION 
Preventive mechanisms attempt either to reduce the possibility of DDoS attacks or enable 
potential victims to endure the attack without denying services to legitimate users. 
• System security mechanisms increase a host’s overall security posture and prevent it from 
becoming part of a botnet or a DDoS victim. Examples of system security mechanisms include 
reliable firewall filtering, proper system configuration, effective vulnerability management, 
timely patch installation, robust antivirus programs, controlled and monitored system access, 
and solid instruction detection. 
• Resource multiplication mechanisms provide an abundance of resources to counter DDoS 
threats, such as increasing the capacity of network bandwidth, routers, firewalls, and servers. 
Additional examples include deploying information services at diverse network locations and 
establishing clusters of servers with load-balancing capabilities. Resource multiplication 
essentially raises the bar on how many bots must participate in an attack to be effective. While 
not providing perfect protection, this last approach has often proved sufficient for small- to mid-
range DDoS attacks. 
 Preventing Flooding Attacks 
     In this section we introduce a general methodology to prevent flooding attacks. It is based on 
the following line of reasoning: 
1. To mount a successful Flooding attack, a large number of compromised machines are 
necessary. 
2. To coordinate a large number of machines, the attacker needs a remote control mechanism. 
3. If the remote control mechanism is disabled, the Flooding attack is prevented. 
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           Our methodology to mitigate flooding attacks aims at manipulating the root-cause of the 
attacks, i.e., influencing the remote control network. Our approach is based on three steps: 
1. Infiltrating the remote control network. 
2. Analyzing the network in detail. 
3. Shutting down the remote control network. 
              In the first step, we have to identify a method to smuggle an agent into the control 
network. In this context, the term agent describes a general procedure to mask as a valid 
member of the control network. This agent must thus be customized to the type of network we 
want to plant it in. The level of adaptation to a real member of the network depends on the target 
we want to infiltrate. For instance, to infiltrate a botnet we would try to simulate a valid bot, 
maybe even emulating some bot commands. 
          Once we are able to sneak an agent into the remote control network, it enables us to 
perform the second step, i.e., to observe the network in detail. So we can start to monitor all 
activity and analyze all information we have collected. 
   In the last step, we use the collected information to shut down the remote control network. 
Once this is done, we have deprived the attacker’s control over the other machines and thus 
efficiently stopped the threat of a flooding attack with this network. Again, the particular way in 
which the network is shut down depends on the type of network. 
6. DETECTION OF FLOODING ATTACKS 
In this section we present efficient way of detecting the attacks on the ITMs in the given 
information theoretic frame work. We divide the attack detection process into two phases, 
Firstly the primary detection of DDoS attacks [20] on the ITMs and the later is the detection of 
flooding attacks on the ITMs. 
In the primary detection phases the system detects the attacks based on traffic information 
aggregated from all monitors in the ITM system. If the overall traffic rate (e.g., volume in a 
given time interval) exceeds a predetermined threshold, the defender issues an alarm. The 
threshold value can be maintained either at data center or the individual ITMs based on the type 
of schemes used [1] in the network.In the primary detection phase the system detects some 
attack was happened in the network. If the detection scheme is centralized, then whenever the 
aggregate traffic exceeds the threshold maintained at the data center then the data center finds 
the attack and that attacked monitor can be identified by verifying the individual traffic logs of 
each ITM from the report. Otherwise if the detection strategy is distributed then each monitor 
maintained an individual threshold and checked the aggregate traffic regularly. If the traffic 
exceeds the threshold then it find the attack was happened and sends the status as attacked to the 
data center. After getting the attacked status from the ITM the data center blocks the 
corresponding ITM and displays the status of the ITM as blocked in the status reports, which 
will avoids the further traffic to or from the attacked ITM with the rest of the networks. 
The second stage of detection specifies the detection of the flooding attacks. Once the attack is 
conformed then the data center identifies the attacked monitor and the traffic logs will be 
handover to the flooding detection phase. In this paper the flooding attacks are generated using 
botnet, so botnet tracking is required to detect and block the flooding attacks on the attacked 
ITM.  
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      In this section we define the approaches for detecting the botnet. Once the botnet is 
successfully identified and blocked then automatically the flooding attacks can be avoided. In 
this connection the honeypots play the major role to block the botnet by identifying the 
command and control through the IRC server. 
6.1 BOTNET Detection 
Botnets are a very real and quickly evolving problem that is still not well understood. In this 
paer we discussed about the way hoe the bots are detected and stopped. We identify three 
approaches for handling botnets:  
  (1) Prevent systems from being infected, 
 (2) Directly detect command and control communication among bots and between bots and 
controllers, and, 
 (3) Detect the secondary features of a bot infection which includes propagation or attacks. 
   The first approach is to prevent the system from the attack, these can be done by using by 
introducing the anti-virus software, firewall or any security measures in the system. 
   The detection of command and control defines the second approach .The controlling of 
botnets are done in general with IRC and detection of IRC can be done by monitoring the TCP 
port 6667 which is used for IRC traffic. . One could also look for non-human behavioural 
characteristics in traffic, or even build IRC server scanners to identify potential botnets. 
  The third approach used to detect the botnet is purely depends on the identification of 
secondary features of bot infection or attack behaviour. Finding the command and control 
directly is not possible in this approach this can be done based on the the correlation of data 
from different sources to locate bots. 
   In this paper we explore the second and third approach for stopping botnets. The problem with 
the first approach is that preventing all systems on the Internet from being infected is nearly an 
impossible challenge. As a result, there will be large pools of vulnerable systems connected to 
the Internet for many years to come. 
 
6.2 Detecting Command and Control 
To avoid the damage of bots, we identified two approaches for detecting botnets: detect the 
command and control communication, or detect the secondary features of a bot infection.  
IRC-based Botnet Detection 
 Today, most known bots use IRC as a communication protocol, and there are several 
characteristics of IRC that can be leveraged to detect bots. One of the simplest methods of 
detecting IRC-based botnets is to offramp traffic from a live network on known IRC ports (e.g., 
TCP port 6667) and then inspects the payloads for strings that match known botnet commands. 
Unfortunately, botnets can run on non-standard ports. Another method is to look for behavioral 
characteristics of bots. One study found that bots on IRC were idle most of the time and would 
respond faster than a human upon receiving a command. The system they designed looked for 
these characteristics in Netflow traffic and attempted to tag certain connections as potential bots 
[15]. 
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The idle IRC activity was successfully detected using this method but it is unable to find high 
false positive rate, for this honeypots is used to minimise the false positives. 
 One attack pool set up a vulnerable system and waited for it to be infected with a bot. They 
then located outgoing connections to IRC networks and used their own bot to connect back and 
profile the IRC server [16].  
Honeypots are used to connect the bots directly rather than connecting IRC server and these 
honeypot checks the characteristics of command and control in outgoing connections. We 
identified all successful outgoing TCP connections and verified that they were all directly 
related to command and control activity by checking the payloads. There were a wide range of 
interesting behaviors, including connections from the bot to search engines to locate and use 
bandwidth testers, downloading posts from popular message boards to get server addresses, and 
the transmission of comprehensive host profiles to other servers.  
  These profiles consists of detailed information about the operating system, host bandwidth, 
users, passwords of the users, file shares, filenames and permissions for all files in the system, 
and a number of other minute details about the infected host. We then analyzed all successful 
outgoing connections for specific characteristics that could be used to identify botnet command 
and control traffic.  
6.3 Collecting Malware with Honeypots 
A honeypot is a network resource (computers, routers, switches, etc.) deployed to be probed, 
attacked, and compromised. A honeynet is a network of honeypots. Honeypot is a special 
software which periodically collects data about the system behaviour and provides automatic 
post-incident forensic analysis. The collected data enables us to determine the necessary 
information about an existing botnet.  
      The honeypots collets the data or attack traffic either from the data center or ITMs based on 
the detection scheme .Two types of detection schemes are defined in this paper based on the 
position of the honeypots. 
Centralized scheme:  In this approach only one honeypot is used for the detection and it is 
placed at the data center. Once the data center identifies the attacked ITM , then the traffic logs 
of the attacked ITM are send to the centralized honeypot  to find the botnet.  
Distributed Scheme: In the distributed approach the honeypots are placed at each ITM  of the 
data center. Whenever the data center identifies the attacked monitor either by using centralized 
or distributed threshold detection approaches, then the attack traffic can be handover to the 
attached honeypot of that attacked ITM. The honeypot then identifies the botnet which causes 
the flooding attack. 
         The centralized scheme is more economical when compared to the distributed scheme 
because it uses only one honeypot at the data center instead of using individual honeypots for 
each ITM.But the efficiency of the system depends on the number of honeypots used in the 
network, If honeypots are more in the network then the detection of botnets is very simple and 
easy. whenever more than one ITMs are attacked in the network ,then the centralized scheme is 
less efficient than the distributed scheme. 
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Figure 3:Set up for tracking botnet using Honeypot 
      GenII Honetpot is a windows honeypoy and used to collect the necessary information about 
the attack. The Windows honeypot runs an unwatched version of Windows 2000 or Windows 
XP. This system is thus very vulnerable to perform the attacks. The average expected lifespan of 
the honeypot is less than ten minutes. The shortest compromise time was only a few seconds: 
Once we plugged the network cable in, a bot compromised the machine and installed itself on 
the machine. 
      As explained in the previous section, a bot tries to connect to the C&C server to obtain 
further commands once it successfully attacked the honeypot. This is where the Honeywall 
comes into play. The Honeywall is a transparent bridge that enables the two tasks Data Control 
and Data Capture. Due to the Data Control facilities, it is possible to control the outgoing traffic. 
Using available tools for Data Control we can replace all suspicious in- and outgoing messages. 
A message is suspicious if it contains typical IRC messages for command and control, for 
example “ TOPIC ”, “ PRIVMSG ”, or “ NOTICE ”. Thus we are able to reduce the bot from 
accepting valid commands from the master channel. It can therefore cause no harm to others and 
therefore we have caught a bot inside our Honeynet. In addition with the detection, we can also 
derive all necessary sensitive information for a botnet from the data we have obtained up to that 
point in time: The Data Capture capability of the Honeywall allows us to determine the DNS/IP 
address of the bot which wants to connet the IRC. 
           In addition, we can obtain from the Data Capture logs the nickname, the indent 
information, the server’s password, channel name, and the channel password as well. So we 
have collected all necessary information about the attack and the honeypot can catch further 
malware. Since we do not care about the captured malware for now, we rebuild the honeypot 
every 24 hours to have a “clean” system every day. This 10 has proven to be a good time span 
since after this amount of time the honeypot tends to become unstable due to installed malware. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The approach integrates active real time flooding attack flow identification from botnet with 
determining required number of honeypots. The honeypot controller has been modeled at Data 
center or ITMs to trigger honeypot generation in response to suspected attacks and route the 
attack traffic to honeypots. The performance of the proposed scheme is independent of attack 
traffic due to presence of honeypots at data center or ITMs. It gives stable network functionality 
even in the presence of high attack load.  
    Some of the avenues for further extensions are with larger and heterogeneous networks. Back 
tracking can be applied on attack flows to reach the attack source. Both of them hold promise 
for evaluating and improving our DDoS detection and defense method and data center 
information protection. The data center load can be still minimized by used some distributed 
load sharing algorithms. 
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